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PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW-IMMUNIZATIONS, LEARNED
INTERMEDIARIES, AND THE MANUFACTURER'S DUTY TO WARN
Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc. (1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
In traditional products liability actions, section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts governs a manufacturer's duty to warn. Section
402A dictates that a manufacturer is strictly liable for a product sold in a
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer."' Products sold absent adequate warnings of risks or dangers
are deemed defective.2 Under Pennsylvania law, however, courts con-
sider certain prescription drugs, including vaccines, "unavoidably un-
safe products."'3 As such, they fall outside the realm of section 402A
strict liability.4 Because section 402A does not apply to vaccines, the
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A
provides:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to
User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to lia-
bility for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer. without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id. Pennsylvania adopted § 402A as law in Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa.
1966).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. h (1965). Comment h
provides in pertinent part:
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal han-
dling and consumption .... Where, however, [the seller] has reason to
anticipate that danger may result from a particular use, . . . [the seller]
may be required to give adequate warning of the danger . . . and a
product sold without such warning is in a defective condition.
Id.
3. Id. at cmt. k.
4. Id. Comment k provides in pertinent part:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowl-
edge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An
outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies,
which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging conse-
quences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a
(1297)
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Incollingo v. Ewing, determined that
vaccine manufacturers owe a "duty to exercise reasonable care" to in-
form users of the product's dangers.
5
In Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit evaluated whether, under Pennsylvania law, a vaccine
manufacturer had met its duty to exercise reasonable care by informing
vaccinees of the dangers of the MMR II vaccine. 6 First, the court ex-
amined whether the learned intermediary rule extended to a registered
nurse who supervised student vaccinations. 7 Next, the court addressed
whether a vaccine manufacturer satisfied its duty to adequately warn vac-
cinees by contractually obligating the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) to provide such warnings.
8
Writing for the Third Circuit, Judge Scirica concluded that Merck &
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully
justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which
they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.... The
seller of such products ... is not to be held to strict liability for unfortu-
nate consequences attending their use, merely because he has under-
taken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable
product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Id. (emphasis added).
5. Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 220 & n.8 (Pa. 1971). The "reason-
able care" standard is set forth in § 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Section 388 applies to chattels known to be dangerous for their intended uses,
and provides in full:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for an-
other to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should
expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endan-
gered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the
chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is
supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is likely to be dan-
gerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition
or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) (emphasis added).
In the prescription drug context, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held
that § 388 applies to both negligence and strict liability actions. Incollingo, 282
A.2d at 219-20 & n.8.
6. Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., 964 F.2d 1348, 1352 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 463 (1992). The Mazurs initially filed suit in the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas, alleging claims against Merck under Pennsylvania law. Id.
Merck subsequently removed the action to federal district court. Id. In evaluat-
ing whether Merck had met its duty of care, the Third Circuit applied Penn-
sylvania law, attempting to "predict how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
decide th[e] case." Id. at 1353.
7. Id. at 1355-61.
8. Id. at 1364-66. "The CDC is an arm of the Public Health Service of the
United States Department of Health and Human Services." Id. at 1350 n. 1. By
providing project grants to state and local agencies, the CDC assists in emer-
2
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Co., Inc. (Merck) did not fulfill its duty to warn by providing warnings to
a learned intermediary, because Pennsylvania courts would not extend
the definition of a learned intermediary to include a registered nurse.9
In addition, the Mazur court determined that Merck retained its duty to
warn vaccinees directly because the Philadelphia Schools dispensed the
MMR II vaccine in a mass immunization program.' 0 Nevertheless,
Judge Scirica ultimately opined that Merck fulfilled its duty to warn vac-
cinees by contractually obligating the CDC to provide adequate warn-
ings directly to the consumer.'I
This Casebrief first supplies a concise historical background on the
learned intermediary doctrine, the mass immunization exception to that
doctrine and the emerging notion of contractually obligating a third
party to provide the required warnings. 12 Next, this Casebrief provides
the factual and procedural circumstances surrounding the Mazur deci-
sion. 13 This Casebrief then investigates the Third Circuit's rationale for
determining that Pennsylvania courts would deny registered nurses
learned intermediary status. 14 Moreover, this Casebrief examines the
implications of the Third Circuit's holding that Merck fulfilled its duty to
warn vaccinees by adequately warning the CDC of the vaccine's risks.' 5
Finally, this Casebrief concludes that the Third Circuit reasonably deter-
mined that Merck fulfilled its obligation to warn, but hastily relied on
inappropriate Pennsylvania cases in determining that Pennsylvania
courts would not grant learned intermediary status to a registered nurse
under appropriate circumstances. 1 6
gency situations and aims to eliminate diseases such as measles. Id. For addi-
tional information regarding the scope of the CDC's powers, see infra note 94.
9. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1358, 1369. In addition, the Third Circuit found that
even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would extend the learned intermediary
doctrine to include registered nurses, Nurse Frederick, who oversaw the admin-
istration of the vaccine to the plaintiff, did not qualify as a learned intermediary
as a matter of law. Id. at 1358-60. For a full discussion regarding the qualifica-
tions of a learned intermediary and why Nurse Frederick did not qualify, see
infra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
10. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1364.
11. Id. at 1350, 1367-69.
12. For a detailed history of the learned intermediary doctrine and the mass
immunization exception, see infra notes 17-27 and accompanying text. For a
brief discussion of contractually obligating a third party to provide the required
warnings, see infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
13. For a detailed discussion see infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
14. For a detailed examination of the Third Circuit's analysis of the learned
intermediary doctrine, see infra notes 48-60 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of the applicability of the mass immuniza-
tion exception to the learned intermediary doctrine, see infra notes 61-75.
15. For complete discussion, see infra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the implications of the Third Circuit's decision in
Mazur, see infra text accompanying notes 97-101.
19931 1299
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine
In 1966, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
first used the term "learned intermediary" to describe the role a physi-
cian plays in warning patients of prescription drug risks.1 7 The learned
intermediary doctrine requires a pharmaceutical manufacturer to pro-
vide adequate warnings to the prescribing physician, who then assumes
the responsibility of passing on these warnings to the patient-con-
sumer.18 Almost all jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, have adopted
17. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966). In Sterling,
the plaintiff developed a degenerative eye disease following use of the arthritis
drug Aralen. Id. at 83. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that because patients rely
on their physicians'judgements regarding medicinal use, "[when] dealing with a
prescription drug.., the purchaser's doctor is a learned intermediary between
the purchaser and the manufacturer." Id. at 85.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court described the learned intermediary's
duty:
it is the duty of the prescribing physician to be fully aware of (1) the
characteristics of the drug he is prescribing, (2) the amount of the drug
which can be safely administered, and (3) the different medications the
patient is taking. It is also the duty of the prescribing physician to ad-
vise the patient of any dangers or side effects associated with the use of
the drug as well as how and when to take the drug. The warnings which
must accompany such drugs are directed to the physician rather than to
the patient-consumer as 'it is for the prescribing physician to use his
independent judgment, taking into account the data supplied to him by
the manufacturer, other medical literature, and any other source avail-
able to him, and weighing that knowledge against the personal medical
history of his patient, whether to prescribe a given drug.'
Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 523 A.2d 374, 378 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1987)(quoting Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 307 A.2d 449, 457
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1973)). See also Virginia H. Castleberry, Note, Hill v. Searle Lab-
oratories: The Decline of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in Favor of Direct Patient
Warnings of Drug Product Risks, 43 ARK. L. REV. 821, 837-46 (1990)(discussing
inception of the learned intermediary doctrine and its subsequent decline);
Kathy Laughter Laizure, Note, The Pharmacist's Duty to Warn When Dispensing Pre-
scription Drugs: Recent Tennessee Developments, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 517, 524-30
(1992) (discussing learned intermediary doctrine and pharmacist's duty to
warn); Alan R. Styles, Note, Prescription Drugs and the Duty to Warn: An Argument for
Patient Package Inserts, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 111, 122-23 (1991) (discussing
learned intermediary doctrine in relation to prescription drug package inserts).
18. Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (Pa. 1971). According to the
doctrine, "[s]ince the drug [is] available only upon prescription of a duly li-
censed physician, the warning required is not to the general public or to the patient, but to
the prescribing doctor." Id. (emphasis added).
In Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974), the court expounded upon the policy underlying the
learned intermediary doctrine:
[W]here prescription drugs are concerned, the manufacturer's duty to
warn is limited to an obligation to advise the prescribing physician of
any potential dangers that may result from the drug's use. This special
standard for prescription drugs is an understandable exception to the
Restatement's general rule that one who markets goods must warn
1300
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the learned intermediary doctrine. 19
Traditionally, courts reserved learned intermediary status solely for
physicians. 20 Under certain circumstances, however, some courts have
held that nurses may qualify as learned intermediaries. 2 1 To date, Penn-
foreseeable ultimate users of dangers inherent in his products... As a
medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into account the
propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient.
His is the task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its
potential dangers. The choice he makes is an informed one, an individ-
ualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both patient
and palliative.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Although the learned intermediary doctrine applies to most pharmaceuti-
cals, the manufacturer retains a duty to warn the consumer directly of the risks of
certain drugs, including, inter alia, oral contraceptives, intrauterine devices, in-
jectable contraceptives and the "morning after" pill. Donald E. Thompson II,
The Drug Manufacturer's Duty to Warn-To Whom Does it Extend, 13 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 135, 141 & n.38 (1985). The Food and Drug Administration requires that
patient labeling or patient package inserts accompany the distribution of these
drugs. Id.
19. Various circuit court opinions illustrate that many jurisdictions apply
the learned intermediary doctrine. See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 863 F.2d
1173, 1178 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding learned intermediary doctrine applies
where patient receives prescription drug or vaccination from doctor who weighs
risks and benefits); Swayze v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 470 (5th
Cir.)(same), reh'gdenied, 812 F.2d 1405 (1987); Walker v. Merck & Co., Inc., 648
F. Supp. 931, 934 (M.D. Ga. 1986) (same), afd without op., 831 F.2d 1069 (11 th
Cir. 1987); Plummer v. Lederle Lab., 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987); Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d
121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968) (same).
As a general rule, Pennsylvania courts agree that the learned intermediary
rule applies to physicians. See, e.g., Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d
1383, 1386 (Pa. 199 l)(holding physician owes duty to inform patient of dangers
or side effects of drugs prescribed); Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (Pa.
1971)(same); White v. Weiner, 562 A.2d 378, 384-85 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989)(same); Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 523 A.2d 374,
378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)(same); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 307
A.2d 449, 457 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973)(same); Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., 742 F.
Supp. 239, 252 (E.D. Pa. 1990)(same) [hereinafter Mazur I].
20. Mazur I, 742 F. Supp. at 253-55. Physicians qualify as learned in-
termediaries because they possess superior knowledge of the risks and benefits
associated with the drugs they prescribe. This superior knowledge is based on
medical literature, information provided by the manufacturer, and the physi-
cian's personal knowledge of the patient's medical history. Mazur, 964 F.2d at
1356.
21. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1356. A leading case extending the learned interme-
diary doctrine to a nurse is Walker v. Merck & Co., 648 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Ga.
1986), afd, 831 F.2d 1069 (11 th Cir. 1987). In Walker, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia held that a licensed practical nurse, who
administered the MMR II vaccine in a program aimed at inoculating select high
school students, was a learned intermediary. Id. at 934. The Walker court rea-
soned that because so few students were to be immunized, it would be "highly
impractical, if not impossible, for Merck to determine which students would
need to receive the vaccine, and then to warn each recipient individually." Id. at
935.
5
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sylvania courts have conferred learned intermediary status only upon
physicians.
22
B. The Mass Immunization Exception
Although the learned intermediary doctrine routinely permits a
pharmaceutical manufacturer to provide adequate warnings exclusively
to the prescribing physician, the vaccine manufacturer retains the duty
to warn patient-consumers directly in situations where vaccines are dis-
pensed in an "assembly line fashion" and "without the sort of individu-
alized medical balancing of the risks to the vaccinee that is contemplated
by the prescription drug exception."' 23 Such "mass immunization" set-
tings first arose when federal, state and local governments dispensed a
live-virus polio vaccine as part of a massive nation-wide immunization
program aimed at curtailing a national polio epidemic. 24
Pennsylvania courts have not yet addressed whether the mass im-
munization exception applies to smaller scale vaccination programs. 2 5
In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to adopt expressly the
mass immunization exception. 26 The Fourth Circuit has noted, however,
that the mass immunization exception, established specifically for the
In Walker, a licensed practical nurse, as opposed to a registered nurse, ad-
ministered the MMR II vaccines. Id. at 932. In Mazur, the Third Circuit noted
that Pennsylvania law recognizes that several types of healthcare professionals
are generically referred to as nurses. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1357 n.12. The Mazur
court used the term "nurse" to refer to registered nurses only. Id.
22. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1356. In Mazur I, the district court recognized that
Pennsylvania had not addressed the question of whether a nurse could act as a
learned intermediary. Mazur 1, 742 F. Supp. at 254. The Third Circuit noted,
however, that both the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania
Superior Court have declined to extend the learned intermediary rule to phar-
macists. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1356; see Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584
A.2d 1383, 1386 (Pa. 1991)(holding pharmacists have no independent duty to
warn consumers of risks attendant to dispensation of prescription drugs); Makri-
podis v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 523 A.2d 374, 378 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987)(same).
23. Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1277 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974) (citing Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968)).
The circuit courts in Reyes and Davis effectively reinstated the manufac-
turer's duty to warn consumers directly in mass immunization settings. For a
discussion of the reasoning of the Reyes and Davis courts, see supra note 18 and
infra notes 24 & 68-70 and accompanying text.
24. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1269-70. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d
121 (9th Cir. 1968), is the seminal case invoking the mass immunization excep-
tion. In Davis, the Ninth Circuit opined that where a drug or vaccine is dis-
pensed to "all comers at mass clinics without an individualized balancing by a
physician of the risks involved" a warning must be given directly to the ultimate
recipient. Davis, 399 F.2d at 131.
25. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1361.
26. Id. The Mazur court assumed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would follow other jurisdictions and adopt the mass immunization exception
"under the appropriate circumstances." Id.
1302 [Vol. 38: p. 1297
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polio vaccine, was "quite narrow and highly fact specific."
2 7
C. Contractually Obligating a Third Party to Provide Adequate Warnings
Because section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts does
not apply to unavoidably unsafe products, section 388 governs the vac-
cine manufacturer's duty to warn.2 8 Section 388 requires that the manu-
facturer exercise reasonable care to ensure that product users are
adequately informed of the product's risks. 29 According to comment n
to section 388, the manufacturer may satisfy this duty by providing ade-
quate warnings to a third party, so long as the manufacturer reasonably
relies on that party to pass on the warnings to the ultimate user or con-
sumer.3 0 Many jurisdictions that apply section 388 in cases involving
unavoidably unsafe products also apply comment n.
3 1
27. Rohrbough v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 470, 478 (N.D.W. Va.
1989)(quoting Stanback v. Parke-Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 647 (4th Cir.
1981)). In Rohrbough, the parents of a child who developed a seizure disorder
after receiving a DPT vaccine sued the manufacturer for, inter alia, failure to
warn. Id. at 472. The Rohrbough court followed the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Stanback, which limited the mass immunization exception to cases involving the
polio vaccine. Id. at 478. Accordingly, the Rohrbough court refused to apply the
exception to a DTP case, even though the plaintiff received the DPT vaccine at a
public health clinic. Id.
28. For a textual comparison of § 402A and § 388, see supra notes 1-5 and
accompanying text.
29. For a comparison of the standards of care each section requires, see
supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. n. Comment n provides
in pertinent part:
Giving to the third person through whom the chattel is supplied all the
information necessary to its safe use is not in all cases sufficient to re-
lieve the supplier from liability .... [I]t is obviously impossible to state
in advance any set of rules which will automatically determine in all
cases whether one ... has satisfied his duty .... There are, however,
certain factors which are important in determining this question.
There is necessarily some chance that information given to the third
person will not be communicated by him to those who are to use the
chattel. This chance varies with the circumstances existing at the time
the chattel is turned over to the third person .... [t]hese circumstances
include the known and knowable character of the third person and may
also include the purpose for which the chattel is given .... [T]he care
which must be taken always increases with the dangers involved.
Id.
31. See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir.
1968)("[I]t is the responsibility of the manufacturer to see that warnings reach
the consumer either by giving warning itself or by obligating the purchaser to give warn-
ing.") (emphasis added). In Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1440 (8th Cir.
1984), however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found
that delegating the duty to warn to a third party did not insulate the manufac-
turer from liability in a strict liability action. The Eighth Circuit decided Petty
under Iowa law, which distinguishes between strict liability and negligence when
formulating the duty to warn for unavoidably unsafe products. Id. at 1439. In
strict liability actions, Iowa courts apply § 402A. Id. Conversely, Pennsylvania
courts make no distinction between strict liability and negligence actions when
7
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III. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
A. Substantive Facts
In response to a late 1970s measles epidemic, the Philadelphia
school system required all children between kindergarten and twelfth
grade to be immunized against several diseases as a prerequisite to
school attendance. 32 Registered school nurses supervised the vaccina-
tions.3 3 For simultaneous immunization against measles, mumps and
rubella, the school district opted to use Merck's MMR II vaccine in its
inoculation program.34 The school district purchased the vaccine from
the CDC. 3 5 Prior to this purchase, the CDC had entered a purchasing
contract with Merck in which the CDC agreed to take "appropriate
steps" to provide warnings to the vaccinees, either directly or through a
learned intermediary. 36 In order to fulfill its contractual obligation to
warn vaccinees, the CDC drafted an "Important Information State-
ment," which school nurses were to distribute to the vaccinees, their
formulating the duty to warn for unavoidably unsafe products. Mazur, 964 F.2d
at 1366 n.26. In Pennsylvania, a manufacturer's duty to warn is governed by
§ 388. Id.
32. Mazur 1, 742 F. Supp. at 243. The school district required each child to
be immunized against measles, mumps, rubella, polio, diphtheria and tetanus,
unless a child had acquired natural immunity through past exposure to the dis-
ease. Id. To determine which vaccines each child needed, the school nurse
reviewed school medical records. Id. The nurse required parents to document
previous immunizations and illnesses, and to give written permission to have
their child vaccinated. Id. If no adequate proof of prior immunization or ac-
quired immunity existed, the school considered the child to be unimmunized.
Id.
33. Id. The school nurse's responsibilities included: (1) sending out paren-
tal permission forms; (2) reviewing health records to check for medical condi-
tions that might increase the risk of inoculation; and (3) assessing whether the
children were in good health on the day of the vaccinations. Id. at 254. A tech-
nician then administered the MMR II vaccinations. Id. at 254 n.20.
34. Id. at 254. MMR II is a live-virus vaccine, containing an attenuated line
of measles virus that causes the vaccinees body to generate antibodies to the
disease. Id. at 243. Merck has manufactured the MMR II vaccine since 1978,
pursuant to a license from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Mazur,
964 F.2d at 1350.
35. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1350.
36. Id. at 1350-51. Merck was initially reluctant to sell MMR II to the CDC.
Id. at 1351. Merck, however, acquiesced when the CDC agreed to provide warn-
ings to the vaccinees. Id. The contract between Merck and the CDC provided
as follows:
The [CDC] represents and agrees that it will (1) take all appropriate
steps to assure that all vaccine supplied to various locations within the
50 states .... pursuant to the terms of this contract, shall be adminis-
tered to each patient on the basis of an individualized medical judg-
ment by a physician, or (2) take all appropriate steps to provide to such
a patient (or to the patient's parent or guardian) meaningful warnings
relating to the risks and benefits of vaccination, in form and language
understandable to such patient, parent or guardian.
Id. at 1351.
8
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parents or their guardians.
3 7
An FDA-approved package insert describing the risks of MMR II
accompanied each MMR II vaccine. 38 The insert contained warnings re-
garding the risk of contracting subacute sclerosing panencephalitis
(SSPE), a serious and often fatal neurological disease, subsequent to re-
ceiving the MMR II vaccine. 39 In addition, the package insert included
information regarding revaccination. 40 In conjunction with the school
program, and over the objections of the mother, Mrs. Mazur, Lisa Mazur
was vaccinated with MMR 11.41 Thereafter, doctors diagnosed Lisa with
37. Id. at 1351.
38. Mazur I, 742 F. Supp. at 244. The FDA-approved package insert differs
from the Important Information Statement issued by the CDC. Merck drafted
the package insert to inform potential vaccine administrators of the risks of the
MMR II vaccine. Thus, "the package circular's intended audience is not the ulti-
mate user, but rather the learned intermediary." Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1348. In
contrast, the CDC drafted the Important Information Statement to inform par-
ents and guardians of the potential risks of vaccination and revaccination. Id.
39. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1348. Pertaining to SSPE, the package insert con-
tained the following information:
There have been reports of subacute sclerosing panencephalitis (SSPE)
in children who did not have a history of natural measles but did re-
ceive measles vaccine. Some of these cases may have resulted from un-
recognized measles in the first year of life or possibly from the measles
vaccination. Based on estimated nationwide measles vaccination distri-
bution, the association of SSPE cases to measles vaccination is about
one case per million vaccine doses distributed. This is far less than the
association with natural measles, 5-10 cases of SSPE per million cases
of measles. The results of a retrospective case-controlled study con-
ducted by the Center for Disease Control suggest that the overall effect
of measles vaccine has been to protect against SSPE by preventing mea-
sles with its inherent risk of SSPE.
Id. (quoting Merck package insert).
SSPE is a fatal, slowly progressing inflammatory disease affecting the central
nervous system. Id. at 245 n.4. SSPE most often strikes children between the
ages of four and twenty, with onset marked by "insidious mental deterioration
and psychological disturbances." Id. Symptoms include convulsions, seizures,
visual difficulties and myoclonic jerks.. Id. Death usually results within one to
three years after the onset of SSPE. Id.
40. Mazur I, 742 F. Supp. at 244. The package insert included the following
information pertaining to revaccination:
Based on available evidence, there is no reason to routinely revaccinate
children originally vaccinated when 12 months of age or older; how-
ever, children vaccinated when younger than 12 months of age should
be revaccinated. The decision to revaccinate should be based on evalu-
ation of each individual case.
Id. (quoting Merck package insert).
41. Id. at 245. Mrs. Mazur claimed that she did not receive the Important
Information Statement, although she admitted being aware of the immunization
program at Lisa's school. Id. at 244. Because Lisa had received a measles vac-
cine at age four, Mrs. Mazur neither signed nor returned Lisa's permission slip.
Id. at 245. Furthermore, Mrs. Mazur informed both the school principal and a
Board of Education official that because Lisa had previously been immunized
against measles, Mrs. Mazur would not consent to Lisa's revaccination. Id. "As
a precaution, Mrs. Mazur kept Lisa out of school for approximately a week
9
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Lisa Mazur and her parents sued Merck under both negligence and
strict liability theories, for failure to warn that MMR II could cause a
serious neurological illness.4 3 Ultimately, the district court granted
Merck's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Merck fulfilled
its duty to warn by providing an adequate warning to a learned interme-
diary, and, in the alternative, by exercising reasonable care to warn vac-
cinees by contractually obligating the CDC to warn vaccine recipients.
44
before sending her back just prior to the day of the immunization program at
Lisa's school." Id. Nevertheless, in the presence of the school nurse, a techni-
cian vaccinated Lisa with MMR II. Id. As a result of her prior vaccination, Lisa
received a second dose of measles and rubella virus. Id. at 245 n.3.
42. Id. at 245.
43. Mazur 1, 742 F. Supp. at 243. The Mazurs originally filed suit in the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1352. Merck subse-
quently removed the action to federal district court based on diversity jurisdic-
tion. Id. In addition to the failure to warn claim, the Mazurs sought recovery
for: (1) design and manufacturing defects; (2) breach and reckless breach of the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose; (3)
intentional and negligent misrepresentation; and (4) negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. Mazur I, 742 F. Supp. at 242-43.
44. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1350. Merck initially moved for partial summary
judgment on several issues; the district court denied the motion in part and
granted it in part. Mazur 1, 742 F. Supp. at 243. The district court denied
Merck's motion on the issues of federal preemption and statute of limitations.
Id. The district court permitted additional discovery on the issues of whether or
not:
a. Merck acted in accordance with due care when it contracted with
[CDC] to ensure the presence of a physician at inoculation or an ade-
quate warning of the risks associated with vaccination was conveyed to
recipients or to their parents or guardians,
b. the school nurse who supervised the MMR II inoculation was a
learned intermediary,
c. the package circular contained an adequate warning of the revac-
cination risks,
d. the proximate cause element of a duty to warn claim had been satis-
fied, and
e. the cause-in-fact element of a duty to warn claim had been satisfied.
Id. at 250-66.
Although Pennsylvania courts had not faced the issue of whether a nurse
could act as a learned intermediary, the district court in Mazur I opined that the
Pennsylvania courts would allow such an extension of the learned intermediary
doctrine in appropriate circumstances. Id. at 254. In reaching this conclusion,
the Mazur I court looked to Walker v. Merck & Co., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 931 (M.D.
Ga. 1986), afd, 831 F.2d 1069 (11 th Cir. 1987), an MMR II case applying the
learned intermediary doctrine to "nurses in general, and, in particular, to the
nurse who administered the vaccine." Mazur 1, 742 F. Supp. at 254.
Although the Mazur I court acknowledged that two recent Pennsylvania de-
cisions declined to extend the learned intermediary doctrine to include pharma-
cists, the court distinguished the roles nurses and pharmacists play in dispensing
prescription drugs. Id. at 254-55. Specifically, the Mazur I court noted that
while pharmacists are frequently mere retailers who are often unfamiliar with
10
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Third Circuit began its analysis in Mazur by determining that a
vaccine qualifies as an unavoidably unsafe product under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 402A.4 5 As such, a vaccine manufacturer must
exercise reasonable care to inform recipients of the risks attendant to
the vaccine's use.4 6 The court then addressed the issue of whether
Merck had, in fact, met its duty of reasonable care.4 7
A. The Learned Intermediary Issue
At the outset, the Third Circuit recognized that, under Pennsylvania
law, a prescription drug manufacturer may meet its duty to warn vac-
cinees by providing an adequate warning to a learned intermediary, as
opposed to the general public or individual users. 48 In light of this rule,
the court evaluated whether Pennsylvania courts would allow a nurse to
qualify as a learned intermediary.
4 9
Although the Third Circuit acknowledged that other jurisdictions
have held that nurses may act as learned intermediaries in certain cir-
cumstances, the court rejected these holdings based on two Penn-
their customers' medical histories, nurses customarily perform tasks similar to
those of physicians and possess individualized information about each patient's
records. Id. at 255. In addition, the Mazur I court relied on legislation to em-
phasize the connection between nurses and physicians. Id. The court opined
that 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8334(a), which provides liability immunity for
physicians and nurses who dispense vaccines in mass immunization projects, dem-
onstrates a legislative awareness of the similarities of doctors and nurses. Id.
After concluding that a nurse could qualify as a learned intermediary, the
district court on remand examined whether Nurse Frederick, who administered
the vaccinations was, in fact, a learned intermediary. Mazur v. Merck & Co., 767
F. Supp. 697, 708 (E.D. Pa. 1991)[hereinafter Mazur II], aft'd, 964 F.2d 1348 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 463 (1992). The court closely examined Nurse Fred-
erick's academic and employment history, experience with immunization pro-
grams, knowledge of the complications associated with certain vaccinations and
preparation for the inoculation program at Lisa Mazur's school. Id. at 708-10.
The Mazur H court acknowledged that Nurse Frederick was unaware that SSPE
was a possible complication of measles or its vaccine. Id. at 709. Nevertheless,
"[hlooking at the totality of [Nurse Frederick's] qualifications and what she did,"
the Mazur II court determined that "it [was] clear that Nurse Frederick was act-
ing as a learned intermediary at the time of Lisa's inoculation." Id. at 711.
45. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1354. The Third Circuit based this conclusion on
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d
206, 220 & n.8 (Pa. 1971), which declared § 402A inapplicable to unavoidably
unsafe pharmaceuticals. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1354. For the pertinent provisions
of § 402A, see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
46. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1354. The Mazur court determined that the correct
standard of care was contained in § 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Id. at 1355. For a recitation of the text of § 388, see supra note 5.
47. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1361-64.
48. See Incollingo, 282 A.2d at 220 ("Since the drug [is] available only upon
prescription of a duly licensed physician, the warning required is not to the gen-
eral public or to the patient, but to the prescribing doctor.").
49. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1356-60.
11
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sylvania cases that denied learned intermediary status to pharmacists.5 0
First, the Third Circuit looked to the Pennsylvania Superior Court's de-
cision in Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., where the court
held that retail pharmacists owed patient-consumers no independent
duty to warn. 5 1 The superior court reasoned that pharmacists were un-
able to provide adequate warnings because, unlike doctors, pharmacists
were often unfamiliar with their customers' medical history and condi-
tions, and therefore were unable to aid customers in evaluating the risks
and benefits of the drugs that their physicians had prescribed. 52
Next, the Third Circuit turned to Coyle v. Richardson-Merrel, Inc. ,53 a
Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, which adopted the findings of the
Makripodis court, and likewise refused to extend the learned intermedi-
ary doctrine to pharmacists. 54 The Coyle court opined that physicians,
not pharmacists, are in the best position to evaluate the risks of the med-
ication they prescribe. 55 Therefore, the Coyle court concluded that phar-
macists could not be classified as learned intermediaries. 56
50. Id. at 1356. The Third Circuit relied on cases Coyle v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1991), and Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 523 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). Mazur, 964 F.2d at
1356. Both cases involved pharmacists, as opposed to nurses. The Third Cir-
cuit relied on these cases because the Pennsylvania courts had never examined
whether a nurse could qualify as a learned intermediary. Id.
51. 523 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). Makripodis was a products liability
action centered on Benedectin, an anti-nausea drug prescribed to pregnant wo-
men in the early stages of pregnancy. Id. at 375. The plaintiffs infant was born
with "certain congenital abnormalities," allegedly as a result of plaintiff's
Benedectin ingestion. Id.
The Makripodis court asserted that to impose upon a retail pharmacist an
independent duty to warn, "would be unwise and would ill serve the interests of
the consuming public." Id. at 378.
52. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1356-57 (citing Makripodis, 523 A.2d at 378). The
Makripodis court distinguished pharmacists from physicians, noting that physi-
cians, "trained in the diagnosis and treatment of diseases" and familiar with
their patients' medical histories, are able to exercise "independent medical judg-
ment" when prescribing drugs. Makripodis, 523 A.2d at 378.
53. 584 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1991). As in Makripodis, the plaintiffs in Coyle were
parents of an infant allegedly injured by the mother's ingestion of Benedectin
during pregnancy. Id. at 1384. The plaintiffs sued the manufacturer and the
pharmacy from whom the plaintiff purchased the drug. Id. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the
pharmacy. Id. at 1387-88.
54. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1357.
55. Id. The Coyle court stated:
Under [the learned intermediary] rule, information about the risks of
medicines is provided to the person who most needs and can best eval-
uate it-the physician-to be shared with and explained to the patient
in the context of his or her individual medical circumstances... . [I]t is
not the pharmacist on whom the public 'is forced to rely' to obtain the
products they need.
Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1386-87.
56. Id. at 1387. Jurisdictions are split as to whether a pharmacist must warn
patients of risks attendant to prescription drug use. Louis P. Milot, Note, 13 S.
12
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Relying on the reasoning of Coyle and Makripodis, the Third Circuit
likened nurses to pharmacists, noting that both groups are unable to
prescribe drugs, are incapable of rendering independent medical judg-
ments and that neither group is required to undergo the rigorous medi-
cal training of physicians. 57 Further, the Mazur court rejected the
district court's assertion that nurses, unlike pharmacists, perform tasks
similar to those performed by physicians. 58 The Third Circuit noted
that nurses' "tasks are typically performed under the supervision of, or
in collaboration with, physicians."' 59 Ultimately, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not grant learned
intermediary status to a nurse who lacks the ability to make individual-
ized medical assessments in prescribing drugs.60
ILL. U. L.J. 1003, 1008 (1989). For a list of cases imposing a duty to warn on
pharmacists see id. at 1008 n.25. For cases refusing to impose a duty to warn on
pharmacists see id. at 1008 n.24.
57. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1357.
58. Mazur I, 742 F. Supp. at 254-55.
59. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1357-58. The Mazur court went on to note that
although registered nurses administer drugs and vaccines, a physician must first
order them. Id. at 1358. In addition, the prescribing agency or institution has
established policies and procedures that nurses must follow when administering
such agents. Id.
60. Id. at 1358. The Third Circuit went on to find that even if Pennsylvania
law would recognize a nurse as a learned intermediary, Nurse Frederick, who
supervised the immunization program at Lisa Mazur's school, was not a learned
intermediary. Id. at 1360 ("We cannot agree [with the district court], as a matter
of law, that Nurse Frederick acted as a learned intermediary on the facts here.").
The Third Circuit's analysis focused on Nurse Frederick's actions on the
day of Lisa Mazur's inoculation. Id. at 1358-60. Nurse Frederick checked stu-
dents' medical records, checked permission slips and examined students' physi-
cal appearance to determine if they appeared "ill that day or if there was some
reason they should not get the vaccine." Id. at 1359-60. She did not ask stu-
dents whether they were presently taking medication. Id. at 1360. Nurse Fred-
erick then instructed the technician as to which vaccine to administer. Id. at
1359.
The Third Circuit also examined Nurse Frederick's educational background
and experience with MMR II. Id. Specifically, the court noted that while she
was aware of the potential side effects and complications that could result from a
measles vaccination, Nurse Frederick was unaware of the possibility of con-
tracting SSPE. Id. Moreover, Nurse Frederick did not remember reading the
package circular that Merck included in each MMR II vaccine. Id. Rather, she
recalled receiving information regarding the risks of MMR II from the Important
Information Statement issued by the CDC. Id. As a result, the Mazur court con-
cluded that Nurse Frederick did not possess "the cumulative medical knowledge
and experience necessary to make an individualized judgment as to which stu-
dents should have been vaccinated," and therefore, Nurse Frederick did not act
as a learned intermediary on the day of Lisa's inoculation. Id.
In Mazur I, the district court noted that the technician who actually adminis-
tered the vaccine did not qualify as a learned intermediary because a technician
is not a medical professional. Mazur I, 742 F. Supp. at 254 n.20.
13
Eskin: Products Liability Law - Immunizations, Learned Intermediaries, a
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
1310 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38: p. 1297
B. Application of the Mass Immunization Exception
The mass immunization rule dictates that where warnings are not
given to patients through a learned intermediary, the duty to warn con-
sumers directly remains with the manufacturer if the prescription drug
or vaccine is dispensed in a mass immunization setting.6 1 The rationale
behind this exception rests on the notion that "the learned intermediary
rule buckles where prescription drugs are dispensed without an individ-
ualized medical balancing of the risks and benefits to the user" 6 2 and
where the manufacturer should reasonably foresee that there will be no
such risk-benefit balancing.6 3 The mass immunization exception is in-
applicable, however, where a learned intermediary is present.
6 4
Because the Third Circuit concluded that no learned intermediary
was present on the day of Lisa Mazur's inoculation, the court next evalu-
ated whether Pennsylvania courts would apply the mass immunization
exception. 6 5 First, the court noted that other jurisdictions have applied
the exception where vaccines were dispensed to "all comers at mass clin-
ics" absent independent or individualized medical assessments. 6 6 In
Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,67 for example, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the manufacturer of a polio vaccine, dispensed as part of a
nation-wide program, was obligated to warn not only the immediate
purchaser, but the ultimate vaccine recipients as well.6 8 The court
61. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1361. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits decided the sem-
inal cases involving the mass immunization exception. Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498
F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.) (applying mass immunization exception where vaccine is
administered absent individualized assessment as to risks and benefits), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.
1968) (same).
62. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1361.
63. Mazur 1, 742 F. Supp. at 255-56.
64. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1363 n.22 ("The duty to warn is imposed on the
manufacturer and in a mass immunization context, where there is no learned interme-
diary, the duty extends to the ultimate recipient of the vaccine.") (alteration in
original)(quoting Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1440 (8th Cir. 1984)).
65. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1361-64. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not,
and still has not, addressed the applicability of the mass immunization exception
under Pennsylvania law. Id. at 1361. However, the Mazur I court held that the
mass immunization exception did not apply because:
[Tihere [was] no evidence to suggest that Merck foresaw that no
learned intermediary would be present at inoculation, the Health De-
partment program was not large enough to be considered a mass im-
munization program, and the vaccine was not dispensed to 'all comers.'
Mazur 1, 742 F. Supp. at 257.
66. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1361.
67. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
68. Id. at 131. At issue in Davis was the use of the Sabin oral polio vaccine,
a live-virus inoculation. Id. at 122. The plaintiff, in good health at the time of
vaccination, contracted polio within thirty days of receiving the inoculation. Id.
The Davis court analogized dispensing vaccines en masse to dispensing over-the-
counter drugs and concluded that lack of risk-benefit balancing by a physician
rendered warnings to immediate purchasers insufficient. Id. at 130-31. Instead,
14
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opined that because the vaccine was issued to all comers without the
presence of a physician to assess the risks, the manufacturer retained the
duty to warn each recipient individually or, alternatively, to ensure that
the purchaser provide such individual warnings. 69
The Third Circuit similarly relied on Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc. ,70 which, like Davis, applied the mass immunization exception where
inoculations were administered without risk-benefit balancing and
where the defendant manufacturer knew or had reason to know of the manner
in which the vaccine was to be dispensed.7' The Third Circuit emphasized
this latter criterion in rejecting Merck's argument that the school pro-
gram, by virtue of its relatively small size, did not qualify as a mass im-
munization situation. 72 According to the court, "[p]rescription drug
manufacturers are charged with knowledge of the distribution system in
which their products are sold."'7 3 Having previously decided that the
school nurse did not qualify as a learned intermediary on the day of
Lisa's inoculation, and by charging Merck with the knowledge that its
MMR II vaccine would be dispensed under clinic-like conditions, the
Third Circuit concluded that the mass immunization exception applied
to the school's program.7 4 Consequently, the court held that Merck re-
tained its duty to warn vaccinees of the risks associated with MMR II
either directly or by obligating the purchaser to do so. 7 5
the Davis court held that the manufacturer retains a duty to warn the ultimate
user or consumer. Id. at 131.
69. Id. ("[I]t is the responsibility of the manufacturer to see that warnings
reach the consumer, either by giving warning itself or by obligating the pur-
chaser to give warning.").
70. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). In Reyes, as
in Davis, the plaintiff contracted polio as a result of a polio vaccination that was
administered as part of a nation-wide inoculation program in an attempt to com-
bat a polio epidemic. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1269. The Fifth Circuit held that where
a pharmaceutical manufacturer knows or has reason to know that its vaccine will
be dispensed without individualized risk-benefit balancing, the manufacturer
must ensure that the ultimate consumer will be adequately warned of the risks
attendant to receipt of the vaccine. Id. at 1276-77.
71. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1363.
72. Id. Although the Third Circuit recognized that program size was rele-
vant in determining the foreseeability that a vaccine would be dispensed in
"clinic-like" conditions, the court found that size alone was insufficient to pre-
clude the application of the mass immunization exception. Id.
73. Id. The Mazur court went on to quote Reyes:
A drug manufacturer is held to the skill of an expert in his field, and is
presumed to possess an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials, and
processes of the pharmaceutical business. Included in such expertise
must be a familiarity with practices and knowledge common in the drug
industry as to distribution and administration of pharmaceutical
products.
Id. (footnotes omitted)(quoting Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1277).
74. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1364.
75. Id. As the Third Circuit stated:
Because we believe the MMR II vaccine was dispensed under "clinic-
like" conditions on the day that Lisa Mazur was inoculated and it was
1993] 1311
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C. Contractually Delegating the Duty to Warn
After concluding that Merck owed a duty to each individual vac-
cinee, the Third Circuit addressed whether Merck effectively complied
with its duty to warn.76 Initially, the Mazur court noted the Mazurs' as-
sertion that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Berkebile v. Brantly Heli-
copter Corp.,77 a section 402A case, described the duty to warn as "non-
delegable."'7 8 In Berkebile, a widow sued a helicopter manufacturer for
failure to warn under section 402A, after her husband was killed in a
helicopter crash. 79 The Berkebile court differentiated the duty to warn in
negligence from the duty to warn in strict liability, and determined that
under section 402A the duty to warn remained non-delegable. 80 The
Third Circuit opined, however, that unlike in Berkebile, the action in
Mazur centered on an unavoidably unsafe product. 8 1 Consequently,
section the 388 "reasonable care" standard applied. 82 Further, the
Third Circuit recognized that comment n to section 388 expressly allows
foreseeable that the vaccine would be dispensed in this manner, we
conclude that the mass immunization exception is applicable here, thus
obligating Merck to warn users of the risks of its vaccine directly.
Id. Accord Davis, 399 F.2d at 131 ("[Ilt is the responsibility of the manufacturer
to see that warnings reach the consumer, either by giving warning itself or by
obligating the purchaser to give warning."); Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276 ("[T]he
manufacturer is required to warn the ultimate consumer, or to see that he is
warned.").
76. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1364-68.
77. 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975).
78. Berkebile, 337 A.2d at 903. The Berkebile court stated:
Where warnings or instructions are required to make a product nonde-
fective, it is the duty of the manufacturer to provide such warnings in a
form that will reach the ultimate consumer and inform of the risks and
inherent limits of the product. The duty to provide a non-defective product is
non-delegable.
Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 897.
80. Id. at 902-03. For a recitation of the Berkebile court's reasoning, see
supra note 78.
81. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1365. In Berkebile, the allegedly defective product
was a helicopter. Berkebile, 337 A.2d at 897. Helicopters do not qualify as un-
avoidably unsafe products under comment k to § 402A; vaccines, by contrast,
do. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965)(including vaccines
among unavoidably unsafe products). The Mazur court relied on the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's decision in Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 220 n.8
(Pa. 1971) when it concluded that § 388 (duty to use reasonable care to warn the
ultimate user) governed Merck's duty to warn. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1365.
For the pertinent text of § 388, see supra note 5. For a discussion of § 402A
strict liability, see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
82. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1365. The reasonable care standard of § 388 may
absolve the manufacturer of liability even if the warnings never reach the con-
sumer. Comment I of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 provides in
pertinent part:
The supplier's duty is to exercise reasonable care to inform those for
whose use the article is supplied of dangers which are peculiarly within
his knowledge. If he has done so, he is not subject to liability, even
16
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a manufacturer to fulfill its obligation by ensuring that the manufacturer
provides adequate warnings to a third party who, in turn, relays the
warnings to the ultimate consumer.
83
Relying on section 388, the Mazur court concluded that "a vaccine
manufacturer may satisfy its duty to warn in the mass immunization con-
text by obligating the CDC to warn users directly." 84 The Third Circuit
further noted, however, that warnings given to the CDC would suffice
only if the manufacturer provided the agency with the pertinent infor-
mation regarding the vaccine's dangers and "reasonably relie[d] on [the
agency] to communicate such information to users in lay terms." 8 5
Based on this conclusion, the Third Circuit examined two issues. First,
the Mazur court addressed whether, as a matter of law, Merck had ade-
quately warned the CDC of the dangers of MMR II. Second, the Third
Circuit examined whether, as a matter of law, Merck had reasonably re-
lied on the CDC to warn vaccinees of MMR II's dangers, including the
risk of contracting SSPE.
86
The Mazur court began its analysis by evaluating the sufficiency of
information Merck gave to the CDC. 87 Specifically, the court assessed
the FDA-approved package insert that Merck included with each vial of
the MMR II vaccine.8 8 The package insert included: recommended
uses, contraindications, a paragraph warning of the dangers of revac-
cination and a paragraph dedicated to the risk of contracting SSPE. 89
The Third Circuit ultimately agreed with the district court's finding in
Mazur II that, based on the state of medical knowledge at the time of
though the information never reaches those for whose use the chattel is
supplied.
Id.
83. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1365. For a recitation of the pertinent parts of com-
ment n to § 388, see supra note 30.
84. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1365.
85. Id. To avoid liability, the manufacturer has "some duty to insure that
the purchaser is capable of passing the warning on to others in the distribution
chain." Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981).
The Third Circuit further noted that the duty to provide the agency with perti-
nent information was continuous: Merck, therefore, retained an ongoing duty to
apprise the CDC of any risks it later discovered or should have discovered
through the exercise of reasonable care. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1366.
86. Id. at 1366-69. The Mazur court limited its analysis to whether Merck
reasonably relied on the CDC to warn MMR II vaccinees. Id. at 1366 n.27. The
Mazur court, therefore, did not address whether it would be reasonable to rely
on an organization other than the CDC. Id.
87. Id. at 1366-69.
88. Id. at 1366. Under Pennsylvania law, the "[a]dequacy of warnings is
determined on the basis of the information that was known or knowable at the
time the cause of action accrued." Id. (citing Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 307 A.2d 449, 458 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973)). Further, warnings conforming
to federal drug labeling requirements "are afforded some deference." Id. (citing
White v. Weiner, 562 A.2d 378, 383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)).
89. Id. at 1366-67. For a recitation of the package insert warnings pertain-
ing to SSPE, see supra note 39.
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Lisa Mazur's vaccination, the package circular provided adequate warn-
ings as a matter of law.90
Next, the Third Circuit considered whether Merck's reliance on the
CDC was reasonable. 9 1 The Mazur court determined that reasonable-
ness depended upon the foreseeability that the CDC would fail to honor
its contractual obligation to forward the warnings provided by Merck. 9 2
The Third Circuit noted that Merck relied on the CDC after receiving
recommendations from physicians and consumer groups, and through
past first-hand experience with the CDC. 93 Based on these factors, as
well as the CDC's "expertise in immunology and public vaccination"
and affiliation with various medical associations, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that Merck's reliance on the CDC was reasonable.
9 4
Ultimately, the Third Circuit concluded that Merck had satisfied its
duty to warn vaccinees of the dangers of MMR II. Merck fulfilled this
duty not by providing information to a learned intermediary, but by con-
tractually obligating a third party, the CDC, to provide adequate warn-
ings directly to the vaccinees. 9 5 Consequently, the Third Circuit
granted summary judgment in favor of Merck on the issue of failure to
warn.
9 6
90. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1366-67. In Mazur I, the district court determined
that the package insert provided sufficient warnings with respect to all risks asso-
ciated with MMR II, except for the risks of revaccination. Id. at 1366. The
Mazur II court, however, found that at the time of Lisa Mazur's inoculation, the
revaccination paragraph in the package circular was adequate in light of the state
of medical knowledge at the time. Id. at 1366-67. The Third Circuit agreed with
the Mazur II court. Id. at 1367.
For a recitation of the portion of the package circular relevant to revaccina-
tion, see supra note 40.
91. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1367.
92. Id. The Third Circuit stated that "[f]or purposes of this inquiry, we
assume, as we must at this stage, that Mrs. Mazur never received the Important
Information Statement." Id. Further, the court pointed out that whether the
Important Information Statement was itself adequate was immaterial. Id. at n.30.
Rather, the issue was whether Merck reasonably relied on the CDC, "not whether
the CDC in fact developed an adequate warning and successfully disseminated it to vac-
cinees." Id. (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 1368.
94. Id. The court elaborated:
The CDC is an agency of the Public Health Service of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services. It is empowered to con-
duct studies, evaluations, tests, and emergency programs in order to
prevent the spread of disease and to improve the public welfare. With
respect to vaccines, it plays a vital role in research, development, test-
ing, and distribution. It publishes the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Re-
port, among other reports, studies, and journals, to educate public
health and medical professionals about the risks and benefits of
immunization.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Mazur 11, 767 F. Supp. at 706).
95. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1369.
96. Id.
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Based on the criteria set forth in section 388 of the Restatement, the
Third Circuit logically determined that Merck, by contractually obligat-
ing the CDC to pass on adequate warnings, had met its duty to inform
vaccinees, including Lisa Mazur, of the risks associated with the MMR II
vaccine.9 7 Therefore, the Third Circuit appropriately upheld the district
court's decision to grant Merck's motion for summary judgment.
Although the Third Circuit determined that a registered nurse did
not qualify as a learned intermediary, Pennsylvania courts, not bound by
the Third Circuit's decision, may decide differently. The Third Circuit's
reliance on previous Pennsylvania caselaw in reaching its conclusion is
tenuous at best. Specifically, the Pennsylvania state court cases cited by
the Third Circuit held that pharmacists could not qualify as learned
intermediaries .98
Although nurses, like pharmacists, are unable to prescribe drugs or
diagnose most illnesses, in an immunization setting nurses play similar
roles to physicians. Nurses and physicians have access to the same med-
ical records, perform similar tasks and, arguably, interact with vaccinees
to the same extent. 99 While the Third Circuit may have correctly con-
cluded that Nurse Frederick's behavior on the day of Lisa Mazur's inocu-
lation did not render her a learned intermediary, Pennsylvania courts are
not bound by the decision of the Mazur court. Accordingly, Penn-
sylvania courts may opt to follow the rationale adopted in other jurisdic-
tions, and find that in certain instances a registered nurse may act as a
learned intermediary. 1
00
97. Id. at 1364-68. For a complete discussion of the Third Circuit's exami-
nation of contractually delegating a third party to provide warnings, see supra
notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
98. See Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1356-60 & 1369 (determining that Pennsylvania
courts would not give registered nurses learned intermediary status because pre-
vious Pennsylvania decisions refused to grant learned intermediary status to
pharmacists); See also Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383 (Pa.
199 1)(granting summary judgment in favor of pharmacy on ground that phar-
macist owes no independent duty to warn); Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharma-
ceutical, Inc., 523 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (same).
For a list of various jurisdictional views regarding a pharmacist's duty to
warn, see Milot, Note, supra note 56 at 1008 nn.24-25.
99. Mazur 1, 742 F. Supp. at 255. In addition to the functional similarities
between doctors and nurses, the Mazur I court noted that the Pennsylvania legis-
lature, in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8334(a), has granted liability immunity to
both doctors and nurses for adverse reactions to vaccines dispensed as part of a
mass immunization project. Id. Thus, the Mazur I court predicted that Penn-
sylvania courts would extend the learned intermediary doctrine to nurses. Id.
100. See, e.g., Rohrbough v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 470, 478
(N.D.W. Va. 1989)(qualifying registered nurse administering DPT vaccine as
learned intermediary), aff'd, 916 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); Walker v. Merck &
Co., 648 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Ga. 1986)(qualifying licensed practical nurse ad-
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If Pennsylvania courts adopt the Third Circuit's approach, then the
Mazur decision could have a profound effect on Pennsylvania product
liability law. Denying learned intermediary status to registered nurses in
mass immunization settings will force vaccine manufacturers to take ad-
ded precautions to ensure that vaccinees are warned of risks. In addi-
tion, to avoid future liability for failure to warn, manufacturers may
require the presence of physicians, recognized learned intermediaries, at
all mass immunization sites. This would place an enormous burden on
both the immunization programs and the physicians required to oversee
them.
Denying learned intermediary status to nurses will undoubtedly in-
crease the burden placed on vaccine manufacturers and distributors by
requiring these entities to provide warnings directly to all vaccinees. The
Third Circuit, however, has created a reasonable method for manufac-
turers to comply with this burden.10 1 By allowing vaccine manufactur-
ers to convey adequate warnings to consumers through contractual
obligations with reliable third parties, pharmaceutical companies may
concentrate on what they do best-researching and marketing new and
much-needed vaccines. Ultimately, therefore, the Mazur decision could
act to improve both available vaccines and public awareness of the risks
and benefits of immunization.
Beth L. Eskin
101. Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1365 ("[W]e believe a vaccine manufacturer may
satisfy its duty to warn in the mass immunization context by obligating the CDC
to warn users directly if it informs that agency of the facts which make its vaccine
dangerous and reasonably relies on it to communicate such information to users
in lay terms.").
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